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J. S. Mill On Hate Speech in the
Canadian Context
Matteo Maciel
University ofYork
Abstract: This paper examines the legal treatment of hate speech in Canadian
society through the lens of John Stuart Mill's Theory of Liberty. In doing so, the core
aspects of Mills theory will be teased out so his response to hate speech in modern liberal
societies may be better understood. The central argument set out is that hate speech is
a violation of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, but such a violation is
saved through application of Mill's "Harm Principle". Even with this application, the
paper argues ought to be a balance of rights. It will be concluded that Canadian Supreme
Court interpretations of the Charter, and for a large part the Charter's drafting itself, lend
themselves to be reminiscent of Mill's theory of harm.
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John Stuart Mill's On Liberly hypotheses a robust theory of freedom. In doing
so, he provides examples of when and how those freedoms can be restricted. Canadian
legislation, specifically Section 319(b) of the Criminal Code, includes provisions which
restrict free speech. These provisions intentionally undercut rights of expression found in
The Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Supreme Court of Canada (SCC) has upheld
3319 in order to prevent harm. The adjudicative and legislative framework existing
within Canada, allows for a Mill-like construction of harm. Examining the Charter,
Criminal Code, and Supreme Court judgments, one may better rurderstand the strikingly
similarity between SCC reasoning, and Mill's demonstrable harm principle. To reach the
aforementioned conclusion, this paper shall explore Mill's theory of liberty and harm. It
will then summarize and compare Mill's principles against crucial judicial and legislative
reasoning regarding 5319. Both Mill, and the SCC set limits unto freedom in the interest
of protecting harms. Criminal charges restricting expression amounting to hate speech
represents a crucial judicial deviation from Canada's liberal democratic 'cousins'the UK
and the US. The limits on hate speech adhere to legal doctrine found in Section 2 of the
Charter, akinto Mill's harm principle.'The case-law supporting 5319 adheres to Mill-
like justifications. Harm unto freedom of expression ought to be examined in two stages.
First, in regard to harm the speech causes to others, and second the harm caused unto the
speaker in restricting that speech,
Mill's theory of liberty is centrally supported through his application of a harm
principle. Liberty extends insofar as those actions do not harm others. Mill deconstructs
the notion of harm unto others as two avenues. The most pertinent of the two are harms
which interfere with permanent interests, ergo, the vital interests of man in his pursuit
of life and liberfy. Mill's discussion of two forms of harm and the remedies to solving
those forms are of particular importance when examining hate speech in Canada. Mill's
theory of liberty is underpinned by the concept that society should allow man to go about
"pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others
of theirs, or impede their efforts to obtain it."" Mills theory is strongly reliant on the
rationality of man. He constructs a theory not upon contract, but through "a certain line
of conduct towards the rest."'i'This conduct outlines "recognition of certain immunities,
called political liberties.""'These immunities protect man's 'permanent interests'. Thus,
individuality and independence form the "indispensable"' basis of permanent interest.
Contrary to John Locke's political rights, Mill's theory heeds caution when outlining
the limits of permanent interests, Rather, the right to not be harmed by others rests at the
core of Mill's utilitarian harm principle." The right to liberfy, security and property form
the basis of the 'opermanent interest[s] of man as a progressive being.""" His theory then,
resolves around Liberty, and the only time liberty should be restricted is for the purpose
of preventing harm to the pefinanent interests of man.
Before examining how the CSC has applied the harm principle in relation to
hate speech, Mill's description of state intervention into the lives of its subject's lives
should also be mentioned; it will help us better understand intervention as prescribed
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by Mill. By understanding what Mill would prescribe, we may better compare whether
the CSC applies Mill's theory in practice. 'The only purpose for which power can be
rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to
prevent harm to others.'v"' This buttresses Mill's theory on liberty. Harm prevention is
the primary authorizer for state sanction surmounting to infringement on liberties. In
order to prevent harm, Mill constructs punishments based on whether or not the harm
affects the permanent interests of the subject. Any harm surmounting to damage less than
permanent interests will not receive state sanction. Mill argues that 'as soon as any part
of a person's conduct affects prejudicially the interests of others, society has jurisdiction
over it.'to Harms which infringe liberties of others less than pernanent interests ought
to be remedied through moral censure. While 'the offender may then be justly punished
by opinion, though not by law.'' These actions might still cause harms, although Milt
writes that they might not justi$r state intervention. Critics within the American field
consistently argue that speech-expressions do not infringe pernanent interests. Case-law
regarding 33l9 has reasoned that hate speech exceeds the permanent interest threshold.
Harm injuring the life, liberty, and properly form the core of permanent interests. In the
work Mill on Liberty: A defense, John Gray helps form a rigid separation between the
two forms when he writes, 'it is not whether a man's interests have been damaged by
other men, but whether his interests ought to be protected"'that way, 'harm to others
is thereby prevented, [...] allowing liberty-limitation only in respect of conduct which
causes fug11.:x/i
5319(2) places clear restrictions on hate speech by sanctioning expressions which
cause harm to others. Mill is quick to caution the dangers of sanctioning actions which
amount to less than harming permanent interests. Academic commentators in favor of
protecting free speech will often refer to Mills advertence toward the tyranny of the
majority as evidence that speech, regardless of how absurd or unpleasant, deserves to be
expressed.
If all mankind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were
of the contrary opinion, mankind would be no more justified in silencing
that one person, than he, if he had the power, would be justified in silencing
mankind.,i,i
Mill's preference to allowing free speech is evident throughout On Liberty. MilI
considered expression to be vital to society. However, Mill's clear delineation of harm
to permanent interests also might support limitations on hate speech. If hate speech is
defined strictly akin to the SCC's meaning, then it seems likely to remain congruent
with Mill's principle of harm. The SCC's judgments in R v Keegstrdi'and Rv Andrewf,
might be used to evidence how the deflnition of hate speech used within 53l9(2) inflicts
harm unto permanent interests. Examining the aforementioned judgments will further
provide opportunity to scrutinize how the SCC traces (albeit rather liberally) Mill's harm
principle. In Canada, the Charter sketches a rough form of pernanent interests. Mill's
92 J. S. Mrrr ON Harn Spppcn...
ideas of life, liberty, and property feature prominently in the Charter, and it is because of
this that we may make such an interesting application.
In R v Keegstra and.R v Andrews, the SCC utilizes 5319 to prohibit willful
promotions of hatred against identifiable groups.-'i In both Keegstra and Andrews, the
Court heard the appeal that 5319 of the Criminal Code violated the entrenched rights
found in the Charter. Speciflcally, the SCC found that 5319 violated section 2(b) of the
Charter.The Charter's core values ensure protection against state sanction or interference.
In the case of section 2(b), this ensures 'the freedom of thought, belief, opinion and
expression, including freedom of the press and other media of communication.'-" The
Charter applies a test of proportionality to its entrenched rights through section 1.n''i' The
result utilizes the Oakes test to allow reasonable limits onto Charter rights in a method
with 'striking resemblance to the factors highlighted by John Stuart Mill's harm-based
approach to justiffing restrictions on liberty."to This allows the SCC to trace limits unto
constitutional rights either for public policy, or to allow a balancing between conflicting
rights. Upon establishing pressing and substantial reasoning, the government policy
resulting in a Charter infringement must create a proportional minimal impairment.
The SCC uses this section to justifu 5319 by applying a Mill-like test of reasonable
impairment to liberty 'reflective in the Supreme Court's requirement that the objective of
the restrictive legislation be pressing and substantial."'
Mill's interpretation of harm seems restrictive to physical harms, and scholars
disagree over whether expression ought to ever be curtailed."i In supporting men of
rational minds, 'Mill said that we should tolerate even the speech we hate because
truth is more likely to emerge in a free intellectual combat from which no idea has
been excluded."''i What 53l9 does not tolerate, however, is not merely speech others
hate. Indeed, its avenue is quite narrow, limited to convictions where a defendant
has been caught 'inciting' hatred 'to provoke or stir up' violence or hatred toward a
person or group of persons"i". Rather than a curtail on expression, it operates more as a
crime against aiding or abetting. Thus, the SCC's narrow interpretation of 53l9 is not
constructed broadly so that it might suppress (, or silence,) unpleasant or untrue speech.
Rather, its intent is to subdue 'abus[ive] or insulting language used against its target
group.',," Contrast these limits with American constitutional rights, and one observes
a stark contrast. In the United Kingdom, Neuberger LJ P traced Mill's construction of
harm in Rhodes v OPO, where the plaintiff claimed the expression found within a book
would cause severe emotional distress.*- Neuberger LJ stated on several occasions the
high scrutiny the Court ought to adopt when contemplating restrictions on free speech.'*'
Rhodes materially differs from Canadian cases in that it was a case of tortious liability.
Although, Mill's theory might be applied to both cases without encountering conflict.
In the case of Rhodes, the defendant lacked the intentionality of causing harm. Rhodes
operates as an example of harm not amounting to pernanent interests. This might be
concluded when considering the Court's judgment at paragraph 96 where it considered
that the information could have been offensive, but, quoting Sedley LJ in Redmond-Bate
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v Director of Public Prosecutions (1999) 7 BHRC 375'free speech includes not only the
inoffensive but the irritating, the contentious, the eccentric, the heretical, the unwelcome
and the provocative provided that it does not tend to provoke violence.'*i,Sedley LJ,s
opinion links directly to Mill, who himself 'acknowledged that restrictions on incitement
to violence could pass his tests for justifiable limits to free speech.',o,iiiIn On Libere,
Mill considers that 'even opinions lose their immunity, when the circumstances in which
they are expressed are such as to constifute their expression a positive instigation to
some mischievous act.'oto Mill's failure to include a hierarchical ranking of permanent
interests is intentional. The liberty of free speech must interact and operate adjacent to
other pennanent interests, it cannot supersede one's own interests nor the interests of
others. Thus, a harm to the security of one, cannot justi$, a disproportionate subjugation
of another interest. The SCC's judgment in Keegstra conveys a clear effort toward
balancing Charter rights. Akin to Mill's permanent interests, the SCC delicately balances
competing rights; respecting freedom of expression whilst setting limits on the acceptable
level of harm speech might create.
53l9 restricts the permanent interests of the hate speaker. The right to freedom of
expression is subdued in an attempt to prevent harm. Similar to the SCC's construction in
Keegstra, the restricted permanent interests would likely be supported by Mill so long as
they serve to prevent harm to permanent interest.*' 5319's prosecution of those intending
to publically 'incite hatred'takes a form similar to defamation. In fact, it holds similar
defenses. The wording of 5319, andthe SCC's interpretation of those words, has been
to restrict speech inciting hate. The question becomes whether hate speech creates harm
sufficient to injure pernanent interests. This causes issues when attempting to congeal
Mill's theory to Canadian law. The SCC has consistently ruled 5319 is a breach of
Charter rights guaranteed to the hate speaker. However, as reviewed above, the harm
the speech causes justify activation of the Oakes test. Mill would likely disagree with
the activation of the Oakes test, he would likely consider that hate speech is necessary to
society and would mirror Sedley LJ as quoted above. 5319's strict, and comprehensive
delineation of acceptable and unacceptable actions found in s3 lg(2) and (3) results in
a strict application of the Criminal code unto expressions which ought to surmount to
harming the permanent interests of members of the public. It has been briefly examined
that Mill's theory of liberly does not encapsulate actions which incite violence. 33l9,s
phrasing of curtailing 'wilful'expressions 'inciting',,,, violence toward groups ought to
mean it serves to protect against harm to permanent interests. Keegs tra and, Andrews
are landmark cases in Canada, and their decisions shed a great deal of light onto what
one may imagine Mill to say. The SCC's justification of S3l9 is that it'constitutes a
reasonable limit upon freedom of expressisn.rxrrii In his majority opinion, C.J. Dickson
expressed that the legislative objective of parliament was to prevent harm.
Parliament has recognized the substantial harm that can flow from hate
propaganda and, in trying to prevent the pain suffered by target group
members and reduce [...]violence in Canada, [it] has decided to suppress the
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willful promotion of hatred against identifiable groups''oii'
We have already briefly discussed how (in line with Mill) the courts interpreted
harm without physicality. Unsurprisingly, there is 'good evidence that many hate
$oups have a history of involvement in racist violence,'**tu and in conjunction with the
discussion of incitement above, willfully promoting hatred against target groups can be
imagined as promoting violence.
Dickson CJ defends 53l9 as a provision preventing harm to others. This ruling
turns crucially on the phrasing of hate speech as 'inciting' violence. Without such a
clear connection to the threat of physical harm, it is unclear whether the SCC's ruling is
congruent with Mill's theory. If this is the case, then 5319 unduly restricts liberty as set
out by section 2 of the Charter. This is parallel to the dissenting opinion of La Forest J
in Keegstra. Regardless of the conclusion, there is no question that '[c]ommunications
which willfully promote hatred against an identifiable group are protected by s.2(b) of
the Charter.' Applying the Oakes test, Dickson outlines 5319 as pursuing a pressing
and substantial objective of protecting pernanent interests of others."-'At the heart of
these interpretations resides the harm principle. The court application of Mill seems to
be deliberate and explicit.
Dickson CJ argues that "section 319 of the Code is an acceptably proportional
response,"xxlr,i to the harms hate speech causes. The expressions 5319 is designed to
halt ,.connotes emotion of an intense and extreme nature that is clearly associated with
vilification and detestation.',xxxt'iii The judgment sets a threshold between mere offense,
and harm to permanent interest. This threshold is not one of a broad interpretation but
rather is constructed narrowly so as to prevent severe and extreme expressions. As 319(3)
outlines, the purview of these restrictions does not prevent truth, religious opinion, or
attempt to curtail discussions for public benefit."'to Rather, the legislation is clearly only
triggered upon the existence of malice, merely reasonable belief of truth or good-faith
is insufficient. Reinforced by the SCC's judgments, 5319 sets out an extremely narrow
avenue in which expressions may cause harm to permanent interests. Incitement of
violence has already been established as quali&i.rg under Mill's harm principle; and
it seems unreasonable for the Court to exclude psychological harm induced by words,*i
especially in light of a tortious remedy available for such forms of injury.'/'In the United
States, the tort of emotional distress has morphed into a tort preventing acts or expressions
which induces 'outrage."/" The comparison between 5319 and IIED in the U.S. shows
two halves of the same coin. In Snyder v Phelps, the U.S. Supreme Court ruIed 8-1 in
phelps' favor holding that the protesting, while 'outrageous', could not overcome the
First Amendment. Alito J, dissenting, echoed the Canadian ruling in Keegstra by stating
that freedom of expression 'is not a license for the vicious verbal assault that occurred
in this case,. xtiii The flexibility found within the Canadian Charter represents a crucial
and fascinating difference between the Canadian and American judicial environments.
That flexibility operates as a Millian mechanism, balancing liberties akin to utilitarian
calculations.
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The majority opinion of Keegstra canonly be understood as congruent with Mill,s
theory if, in being protected by Section 1, the harms mentioned above are damaging to
pernanent interests. This is likely due to the striking similarity between the Oakestest and
Mill's harm principle test.'/i'Dickson CJ's statements support the belief that hate speech
causes permanent harm- The court is quick to note that "S319(2)was introduced into the
Criminal Code only after extensive study by the Special Committee on Hate propaganda
in Canada."*i'The study found that hate speech incited or caused harm through violence;
an objective the SCC believed to be pressing and substantial. Dickson CJ's judgment set
a "reverse onus ofproof regarding the truth defense,'placing the burden on the defendant
'so as to make it more difficult to avoid conviction where the willful promotion of hatred
has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt.'xlv; flr. burden correspondingly creates
fuither complications with presumptions of innocence. The SCC has rectifled this lacuna
through a standard of proof known as the 'air or reality'which operates similar to Sl01
of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980 in England, where, when a defendant relies on an
exception, the legal burden rests on him. The combined result places an immense burden
on the judiciary to justiff the use of the Oakes test. By constructing 5319 narrowly, the
SCC may by-pass these burdens by prosecuting hate-speech which harms permanent
interests. Without harm to permanent interest, Mill would describe such speech acts as
offensive but amendable through moral censure. The dissenting opinion of Keegstra
mirrors this view of harm from hate speech. In dissenting, La Forest J believes that
5319 is violating liberty. La Forest J, much like Dickson CJ, where he approaches this
question by using Mill as a lens. La Forest J argues that 5319 constitutes a .significant
infringement on the guarantee of freedom of expressiorr. rrA'ii A vein of Mill is seen in La
Forest's opinion when he writes that 5319 violates:
the vital values upon which s.2(b) of the Charter rests: the value of fostering
a vibrant and creative society through the marketplace of ideas; the value of
the vigorous [sic] and open debate essential to democratic government and
preservation of our rights and freedoms; and the value of a society which
foster the self-actualizationand freedom of its members.'/,,,,
La Forest J interprets the harm caused by hate speech as a harm of a lesser form.
He does so in line with American judicial opinions. By interpreting the harm caused by
hate speech as not infringing on pennanent interests, La Forest J's interpretation warrants
the striking down of 5319. The remedy to hate speech, would instead be moral censure,
or 'the business of educatisn.:;r/ix Mill speaks briefly to these matters, and prescribes that
'[t]he offender may then be justly punished by opinion, though not by law.'/ However, as
the SCC identifies, moral censure
The case itself provides issue to this opinion however. Mill advocates education
as a central feature defending against offensive behavior. This is primarily because Mill
believes in the reason of man. In Keegstra, the defendant was a teacher, indoctrinating
students of anti-Semitic, anti-holocaust hate-speech through academic testing. The
96 I. S. Mlrr ON HerP SPnr,cu...
indoctrination is crucial in that his actions undermine Mill's dependent on education as
a resolution to hate speech. In such an example, the defendant's position as an influencer
unto children would undoubtedly invoke Mill's penchant toward protecting children.
This was reflected in the Court's judgment. Mr. Keegstra's capacity to suppress fact,
and grade children academically based upon his personal belief speaks not only to the
issue of hate speech, but also to the issue of federal academic standards. InAndrews, the
SCC recognized the grave danger hate propaganda posed, and reasoned that the 'wilful'
actions might be analogous to drink driving;
a driver with a blood alcohol count of over 80 is guilty of an offence although
it has not been demonstrated that the particular accused has occasioned
any danger to a victim or that his driving at the moment of apprehension
constituted a danger in itself. Rather the very basis for creating the offense
depends on the empirical potential of danger the act itself poses.i' The danger the Court
recognizes is not that of actual harm per se, but still harm as it refers to Mill's permanent
interests. In identiffing the pressing and substantial nature of s. 319, Dickson CJ cites the
Special Committee on Hate Propaganda in Canada'
The repetition ofthe loathsome messages ofNazi propaganda led in cruel and
rapid succession from the breaking of the shop windows of Jewish merchants
to the dispossession of the Jews from their property and their professions, to
the establishment of concentration camps and gas chambers. The genocidal
horrors of the Holocaust were made possible by the deliberate incitement of
hatred against the Jewish and other minority peoples'/"
It is here that Mill and Dickson CJ's opinion diverge. They do not, however,
conflict. Dickson CJ's approach and application of Section I of the Charter strongly
resembles Mill's utilitarian approach to harm. In the same way that Mill balances 'utility
as the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions,'ii" so too does section 1 attempt to preserve
a limit on liberties when the objectives are pressing and substantial'
Mill's theory of liberty is buttressed by the concept that certain interests, those
perrnanent to man, cannot be infringed upon. In this same way, the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedqas outlines basic constitutional rights. These rights are not untended,
and much like the remaining 'living tree' constitution, cannot growth wildly without
risk of being pruned. Just as Mill's theory advocates limits to permanent interests, so too
does the Canadian Charter. The Supreme Court has subsequently created a formula in
which to test the legitimacy of those restrictions. This again mirrors Mill's own ideas.
The right of expression hold within it, its own crux. Offensive content falls within the
broadly constructed right but this content ought not to necessarily be allowed. 3319
provides a measured attempt to discourage and sanction offensive content deemed to go
too far. Dickson CJ's decision seems to answer directly to this argument. By constructing
hate speech narrowly, one attempts to balance the competing interests between libetf
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and security. The onus of proof for the defense of truth, which exists on the balance of
probabilities, makes conviction extremely difficult. The margin between merely offensive
and criminal remains behind ahaze. Future charges which fall along the margin will be
extremely difficult. However, there has been consistent clarity by the SCC regarding
the fact that wherever the margin falls, there are clear and demonstrable cases where
conviction is justified. The wilful promotion of hatred onto a target group, nefariously
utilizes liberty. As Mill astutely writes; 'the oral rules which forbid mankind to hurt one
another are more vital to human well being than any maxims, however important.'/tu This
mirrors Dickson CJ's judgment in Keegstra which only comes short of explicitly citing
Mill's principle as a guiding policy.
Mill's theory of liberty and its harm principle create a framework for rights and
their limits. Guided by utilitarian principles, Mill's prescriptions are starkly similar to
the framework used by the Supreme Court of Canada to approach hate speech through
the Charter of Rights and Freedoms.lnapplying this framework the Court has delicately
examined section 319(b) of the Criminal Code in an effort to balance liberfy and security.
One is able to see traces of Mill's theory and application ofhis harm principle throughout
Supreme Court judgments. Keegstra and Andrews highlight remarkable similarities
between Mill and modern judicial reasoning in Canada. What is centrally clear is this:
If expression inciting violence and hatred is interpreted as threatening the permanent
interests of others, then the Canadian Supreme Court's judgments run along Mill's free
speech writings found in On Liberty. Regardless of the interpretation of hate speech and
harm, the Supreme Court of Canada's application of Millian principles is fascinating and
one must wonder whether a more explicit application of Mill ought to be found within
the Canadian context.
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